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Depending on the scale and distance o f migration, a variety of challenges face both 
those moving because of climate impacts and the communities receiving these migrants. 
The lessons drawn from resettlements and planned relocations thus fa r— most notably 
in the Carteret Islands of Papua New Guinea— underscore the importance of adequate 
funding, careful planning, restoring traditional livelihoods, and ensuring voluntary com­
munity participation throughout the entire process. Critical hurdles persist, however, 
particularly for the most vulnerable communities within nation-states. This article 
explores the importance of adequate funding and identifies the dangerous and nagging 
impediments present, even as climate-induced migration advances in the adaptation 
discourse. W ith a focus on the Carteret Islanders’ ongoing relocation and resettlement to 
the island of Bougainville, this article argues that communities may face economic devel­
opment and political gaps. Economic development gaps inhibit communities’ abilities to 
address redevelopment needs that elude appropriate classification for funding because 
they are neither strictly “climate” nor “development” categories. Additionally, political 
gaps exacerbate the challenges of accessing existing funding for local communities that 
are at odds with the national governments that purportedly represent their interests. 
These gaps compound the general lack of adequate funding for climate change mitiga­
tion and adaptation. Considering models for a new framework, this article explores the 
applicability o f existing community-oriented funding regimes to address the political and 
economic development challenges that climate migrants face.
A politically contentious issue, climate change-related migration suffers from ambivalent recognition in many forums, including in legal, political, and 
international negotiations. The existence of the climate change migration phe­
nomenon, however, at least for the kinds of relocation typical of small island atoll 
communities in the Pacific, is credible and verifiable. 1 Indeed, a number of com­
munities are already well into the process of relocation—and for each, durable 
solutions are critical. 2
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This article focuses on the relocation difficulties facing communities that are 
currently moving as a result of climate forces, specifically in Papua New Guinea 
(PNG). A review of their plight reveals that two important gaps in assistance com­
pound the inherent challenges of relocation and cause the nagging lack of funding 
for climate change action, generally, and adaptation, specifically. These gaps are 
either economic development gaps—in which communities cannot address redevel­
opment needs that, because they are neither 
strictly “climate” nor “development,” elude 
appropriate classification for funding—and 
political gaps—in which existing funding 
is inaccessible for local communities that 
are at odds with the national governments 
charged with representing their interests.
This article first provides a brief back­
ground on the contested phenomenon of 
climate-induced migration and then looks 
at the specific instances of planned reloca­
tion in the South Pacific. Extrapolating 
from concerns of the Carteret Islanders of PNG, this article later explores the gaps 
in research and management that hamper relocation and may adversely affect suc­
cessful, long-term resettlement. In the final part, it considers the perils and pos­
sibilities of current funding regimes and explores possible amendments to improve 
the odds of success for relocating communities. Considering sound models for a 
new framework, this article explores the applicability of existing, though smaller, 
community-oriented funding regimes and community-based adaptation generally 
as a paradigmatic framework to address the political and economic development 
challenges that climate migrants face.
There exists significant 
controversy regarding 
the ability to attribute 
the decision of indi­
viduals to leave their 
homes permanently and 
relocate due to climate 
change.
MIGRATION IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC
While the movement of peoples as a result of climate change-induced pressures 
may be difficult to predict and clearly identify, certain types of movement are more 
straightforward than others. Because of the generally multi-causal nature of migra­
tion, there exists significant controversy regarding the ability to attribute the deci­
sion of individuals to leave their homes permanently and relocate due to climate 
change. 3 The uncertainties regarding the extent and magnitude of the changing 
climate, the elusiveness of a credible and consistent number of possible migrants, 
and the absence of a clear legal status and framework for those who might move— 
particularly across borders—compound the attribution uncertainties. The migra­
tion of small islanders due to sea-level rise, coupled with more devastating storm
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surges and king tides, however, is more certain.4 Accordingly, researchers and 
climate migration skeptics have largely excluded this category of migrants from 
the more general and contentious debates surrounding the relationship between 
climate and migration or dislocation.5
Throughout the Pacific, efforts to relocate communities are currently underway 
that highlight the need for effective management and funding. Recognizing the 
existential threat to its territory and people, Kiribati has been developing a reloca­
tion policy it calls “migration with dignity.”6 The president of Kiribati has recently 
purchased arable land in Fiji to assist with food production, which is currently 
compromised in Kiribati by climate-related saltwater intrusion.7 That land will 
also serve as a place to relocate some, if not all, of its citizens when it becomes 
necessary.8 In the Solomon Islands, Choiseul—a township of about 1,000 people 
on Taro Island—lies less than two meters above sea level and is the first provincial 
capital in the Pacific to orchestrate a relocation with all of its services and facili­
ties to be moved.9 Threatened by storm surges and rising seas, and eager to move 
swiftly, the community consulted a team of engineers, scientists, and planners, and 
decided that, while implementing disaster prevention measures in the near term, 
it would concurrently construct a new town on an adjacent mainland and move 
communities in stages.10
While many hail the Choiseul relocation as a model for other provinces across 
the nation and the Pacific, there are remaining funding and management needs for 
a successful transition." For this township and similarly situated communities, a 
variety of challenges face both those moving and the communities receiving them. 
The most common risks associated with displacement and resettlement processes 
include: landlessness, unemployment, homelessness, marginalization, food insecu­
rity, loss of access to common property, and social disintegration.
The lessons drawn from resettlements and planned relocations thus far—most 
notably in the Carteret Islands of PNG—might help to ensure the most successful 
resettlement for communities that must relocate. Some 2,000 Carteret Islanders 
are in the midst of permanently resettling from their tiny islets in the Carteret 
Atoll to mainland Bougainville. Separated by a three-hour boat ride, the move to 
the mainland marks a significant departure for the islanders and an unprecedented 
challenge for the national and international infrastructure that must now fund and 
manage this kind of move.12 In addition to coping with the devastation of the atoll 
due to rising seas, saltwater intrusion in freshwater wells and taro fields, an unprec­
edented occurrence and intensity of king tides, and accompanying erosion of 
culture for the “taro people,” islanders have suffered from their own government’s 
resistance to act and a lack of assistance from the international community.13 In 
response, the Council of Elders initiated a plan for resettlement. Coordinating
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the move since 2006, Ursula Rakova is leading the permanent resettlement to 
Bougainville and, most importantly, attempting to ensure that the islanders will 
be self-reliant in their new home.14
The move toward self-reliance has been contingent not only on the removal 
of obstacles presented by various layers of government, including the national 
government, but also on the delivery of an adequate and more expansive view
encumbered poorly endowed community-based efforts and stymied swift and 
effective strategies to relocate.17 According to Rakova, donors objected to the first 
set of homes built, arguing for cheaper, less resilient houses. Furthermore, tens of
PNG could not be used for house construction, as it did not conform to prescribed 
categories for climate aid.18
The Carteret Islanders’ experience vis-a-vis funding is not unusual, yet ade­
quate funding is absolutely essential to address the challenges of climate-induced 
relocation.19 It not only facilitates the necessary studies for proper planning, but 
also supports participatory processes critical for community engagement and, 
hopefully, a successful resettlement process with dignity and long-term self-reli­
ance at its core.
ADAPTATION, FUNDING, AND MIGRATION: AN OVERVIEW
The Funding Landscape and Its C urrent Shortfalls
A concerted effort to place climate-induced migration firmly in the adaptation 
infrastructure has gained traction. Framing relocation as an adaptation strategy
The bureaucracy 
and complexity 
of process have 
encumbered
based efforts and
endowed
community-
effective strategies 
to relocate.
of climate-related funding. To craft their eighteen- 
step process—including community profiling and 
assessment, which resulted in the islanders owning 
land, initiating home building, and exploring sus­
tainable economic development—Rakova relied on 
small amounts of seed money from the New Zealand 
Fligh Commission in PNG and the nonprofit, Global 
Greengrants Fund.15 Additional funds for critical 
items such as “education of the younger people, 
health facilities, economic opportunities for the 
islanders, and trauma counseling for the families that 
[we are] moving, as well as the host community” was 
not forthcoming from larger donors or PNG.16 The 
bureaucracy and complexity of the process, for both 
international donors and the PNG government, have
thousands of dollars earmarked for climate adaptation for the islands and atolls of
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rather than a “last resort” is important for a number of reasons. Notably, this 
framing may allow communities to access existing and ostensibly growing resources 
earmarked for adaptation. " Indeed, “[a] major obstacle to moving forward on the 
issue of guidance on planned relocations in the light of climate change is the lack 
of information on adaptation funding and the extent to which it might be available 
to support work on human mobility in general and planned relocations in par­
ticular. A critical funding shortfall remains, however, particularly for the most 
vulnerable communities within nation-states. It is widely acknowledged that miti­
gation and resilience-building require significant and diverse financial investments, 
from both public and private and domestic and international sources. Climate 
finance, therefore, will have twin mandates to provide high-quality funding to aid 
in limiting global temperature increases to 2° Celsius and to assist vulnerable com­
munities through adaptation and, perhaps over time, mitigating loss and damage.22
All funds appear woefully undercapitalized, with potentially devastating 
impacts to both decarbonization and preparedness. Estimates for investments 
necessary to keep average global temperatures below 2° Celsius range from $0.6 
trillion per year by 2020 to $1.5 trillion per year.23 For climate change adapta­
tion not necessarily including migration and loss and damage monies—annual 
investment estimates range from $49 billion to $171 billion.24 These estimates 
far exceed the aspirational goals of the international community to disburse $100 
billion per year for both mitigation and adaptation by 2020.25 Current estimates 
of climate finance range from $340 billion to $650 billion per year.26 This short­
fall is more consequential for those who are climate displaced, like the Carteret 
Islanders. The funding gap occurs because “displaced persons and their home 
countries lack guaranteed financial and material assistance for resettlement.”27 As 
noted previously by several researchers, absent international financing, “It seems 
unlikely that governments in many affected developing countries will have the 
necessary resources to plan and implement resettlement plans that uphold the 
rights of communities,” especially because it is “precisely those governments that 
are likely to experience increased financial pressure on other fronts as a result of 
climate change (e.g., decline in tourism or fishing industries, lower tax revenues, 
and perhaps increased political turmoil).”28
C onceptual Shortfalls in C limate Finance H indering A daptation and 
M igration
The failings of climate finance management and disbursement exacerbate 
continued undercapitalization. At present, adaptation does not receive a sufficient 
share of the limited funds, and migration receives even less recognition and much 
less funding within the extant adaptation frameworks.29 In 2010, an additional
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funding source for climate adaptation was established in the form of the Green 
Climate Fund, supplementing existing institutional arrangements that disburse 
adaptation finance consistent with the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC).30 It was also the 2010 UNFCCC meetings in Cancun 
at which the international negotiations produced text acknowledging migration 
and the need for a management framework to address the phenomenon.31 There is,
however, no widely recognized and agreed upon esti­
mate for the potential costs associated with climate 
migration, save for the discrete migration estimates 
of small island communities such as Choiseul and 
the Carterets.32
That this kind of migration occurs internally, 
rather than across international borders, will con­
tinue to confound the management and finance 
infrastructure that might respond to the necessary 
relocations. Such migrations are also highly likely to 
be expensive—stretched into the hundreds of mil­
lions, as estimated by the government of the Solomon 
Islands.33 Further, and perhaps most relevant to the 
present discussion, while most resilience-based efforts 
occur at the local level, there is an absence of com­
mitment and accompanying infrastructure at the international level to channel 
adaptation finance to local communities.34 The community level is the capacity at 
which contributions of women, indigenous peoples, and other especially vulnerable 
populations are most able to construct a plan for resilience and relocation that is 
consonant with their own conceptions of well-being and cultural survival.35
To accelerate their relocation and establish a viable engine of economic 
development for well-being and self-reliance the Carteret Islanders, for example, 
founded Bougainville Cocoa Net Limited. The company grows and exports organic 
cocoa, sustaining family incomes and promising the eventual hope of suspending 
the pursuit of donor funds permanently.36 This kind of economic development is 
critical to the sound resettlement of communities, yet this can often be the hardest 
investment for which to find funding.37 To achieve durable solutions, however, “the 
availability of livelihoods and development oriented recovery activities” appear 
critical.38
In sum, it is unknown if or how migration needs are factored into estimates 
of the cost of sound climate change adaptation. The fact that no single financial 
vehicle covers all climate-induced migration scenarios makes this all the more 
challenging.39 Though there are several existing finance mechanisms, the level of
There is an 
absence of 
commitment and 
accompanying 
infrastructure at 
the international 
level to channel 
adaptation 
finance to local 
communities.
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funding is not sufficient for current and future scenarios.40 Some scholars have 
argued for the creation of a new comprehensive, global funding mechanism to 
aid resettlement efforts, which would allocate countries’ contributions based on 
common but differentiated responsibilities, taking into account each country’s 
contribution to climate change and its capacity to pay.41 Others argue that targeted 
regional responses, based on negotiations between states in the same region, may 
be more appropriate than a global response.42 Given the general lack of funding 
for resettlement, one scholar has contended that it may be better to strengthen 
existing adaptation funds rather than create an entirely new mechanism, which 
may end up reducing countries’ contributions and even diluting the total assistance 
that developing countries receive.43 Whichever framework prevails, in order to 
work most effectively, financial institutions should seek to minimize bureaucracy 
and “avoid cumbersome rules of procedure that make it difficult to reach those 
who need help.”44
Furthermore, if the most vulnerable are going to benefit directly from funding, 
it is essential that funding directives appropriately align with national, as well as 
local, communities’ needs—namely sustainable economic development for long­
term self-sufficiency.
Much more is needed beyond the individual and ad hoc management for relo­
cation of affected communities, which are all currently underfunded. Indeed, the 
lack of capital makes it more important that the funds are used efficiently to build 
resilience at the local, national, and regional levels. The politics of climate finance 
and policymaking may, however, confound these efforts.
Political O pportunism in C limate R esponses
The friction between the Carteret Islanders and provincial and national gov­
ernments described above is not unique. In fact, the politicized nature of climate 
policy and finance and related fields—including urban planning and control, 
donor expenditures, and population consolidation plans, among others—reveal 
the existing and growing potential for indifference and, worse yet, malfeasance 
at the administrative level. Even absent malfeasance, insufficient information at 
the national level inhibits optimal resilience-building at the local level, all further 
militating in favor of funding for locally devised adaptation and relocation plans.45
International climate finance has predominantly been funneled through 
national financial management systems.46 This top-down model ignores historical 
antagonisms between marginalized groups and governments and facilitates further 
marginalization through the execution of facially progressive climate policy.47 
Some scholars and researchers have identified instances in which the state allows 
climate-related risks to exist as part of larger, politically charged land use plan-
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ning.48 Others recount the role of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD+) in facilitating state-sponsored dispossession of ancestral 
lands to access financial incentives for developing countries that reduce carbon 
emissions through forest conservation efforts.49 Still others note that annual 
environmental funding runs close to $300 billion, but it remains unclear “how 
the money is spent.”50 What appears evident, however, is that a bulk of available 
funding goes to governments as well as large corporations, and only a small portion
ously unpopular resettlement and migration policies.”53 The government of the 
Maldives, at times an important voice for the ethical implications of climate- 
induced migration, had earlier proposed, for ease of administration, the consolida­
tion of populations dispersed over 200 islands onto ten to fifteen islands. When 
introduced in the 1990s and early 2000s, the relocation proposal was widely 
unpopular, meeting “overwhelming resistance.”54 Invoking an “environmental dis­
course,” the Maldivian government has reintroduced these resettlement policies, 
buttressed by the “universal acceptance” of sea level rise. Environmental exigencies 
now fuel a plan that was once a strategy based on economic and political pressures. 
At best, mistrust of the government’s current motives sullies the consolidation 
plans, with uncertain results.55
Allusions to safety risks—supported by the complexity of climate science, in 
the purview of expert knowledge rather than purportedly less sophisticated local 
peoples—has served to advance political goals. This is just one of many instances 
in which government planning and local well-being can be misaligned, if not
Thus far, this article has attempted to identify two significant gaps in the 
current funding infrastructure. In addition to the crippling underfunding of 
climate mitigation, particularly that of adaptation efforts, there is a constrained
Mistrust of the 
government’s
of it reaches the most vulnerable communities it is 
meant to serve.51
consolidation 
with uncertain 
results.
current motives 
sullies the current
Particularly relevant to migration due to climate 
change, some relocation policies demonstrate the 
ways in which top-down policies can obscure, if not 
completely contravene, the wishes of the local com­
munities.52 Looking closely at the Maldives, scholar 
Uma Kothari examines the “political imperatives 
that are influencing discussions of climate change 
and migration, and specifically how environmental 
discourses are being mobilized to reintroduce previ-
whollv at odds.
ADDRESSING GAPS THROUGH EXISTING FUNDS
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interpretation of what qualifies as credible and relevant adaptation responses, 
which severely impacts relocating communities. This is the “funding gap” that 
omits funds for sound resettlement through economic development. There is also 
an absence of sizeable and consistent funds for community-level adaptation to 
local entities. This is the “political gap” that favors a top-down, national govern­
ment-oriented response over the more appropriate bottom-up, community-based, 
and community-responsive approach. There are possibilities to address these gaps 
in existing infrastructure, if appropriate attention is given to identifying these gaps 
and bridging them in a rigorous fashion.
The next two sections look at the Green Climate Fund, the Global Environment 
Facility, and the Adaptation Fund for possible resolutions.55 The last section con­
siders the role of alternative funding sources that might work in harmony with the 
above global funds.
A mending the G reen C limate Fund
Given its stated ambition and that it is still in the development phase, the 
Green Climate Fund (GCF) provides a unique opportunity to address the above 
challenges through directed and purposeful policy. Established at the Cancun 
Climate Change Conference in 2010 as an operating entity of the Financial 
Mechanism of the UNFCCC, the parties to the FJNFCCC intend for the GCF 
to serve as the centerpiece of efforts to raise $100 billion a year by 2020.57 The 
GCF board recently agreed on how it will operate, who can distribute money from 
the fund, and how much control countries will have over funded projects. The 
fund’s mandate is to play a key role “in channeling new, additional, adequate, and 
predictable financial resources to developing countries and will catalyze climate 
finance, both public and private, and at the international and national levels.”58 It 
is the “epicenter” of twenty-first century climate finance that will determine “the 
direction of both public and private investment over the next decades,” according 
to the executive secretary of the UNFCCC.59
The GCF, as currently conceived, includes some promising elements from the 
vantage point of the climate displaced. The board determined that, over time, half 
of GCF funds will go to adaptation and half will go to mitigation, with half of 
the adaptation funds allocated to the most vulnerable nations.60 This rebalancing 
of funds allocation is significant, as adaptation efforts have been “structurally 
underfunded.”61 Further, the GCF announced that it is working to increase access 
to funding for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in the coming months 
through its readiness and preparatory support program. Thus far, SIDS’ requests 
for readiness support have ranged from helping to create strategic frameworks for 
engagement with the fund to program development and meeting accreditation
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requirements for national implementing entities.62 Finally, and in an important 
nod to assisting historically vulnerable populations who have been less involved in 
decisionmaking, the GCF will assess social and economic co-benefits, as well as the 
gender-sensitivity of its investments. In general, and at least in stated intention, 
GCF investments have lofty and potentially game-changing aspirations.63
Country ownership is of particular importance in GCF administration. 
Mandated to be a central determinant of finance decisionmaking, the principle 
of country ownership is progressive in stated intention, but may have deleterious 
effects when considered alongside the political exigencies of migration and reloca­
tion. The principle reflects an important departure from the extant yet hidden 
system of climate finance in which donor governments dictate the terms for 
accessing funds.64 GCF affirmatively seeks to “promote and strengthen engage­
ment at the country level through effective involvement of relevant institutions 
and stakeholders.”65 National Designating Authorities, or another agreed-upon 
country-level focal point, will determine modes of access and prioritize alloca­
tions of funds consistent with goals set at the national level. This is a welcomed 
departure from the paternalism that has characterized many international finance 
arrangements. It is also, however, a method that might further entrench existing 
indifference or antagonisms toward vulnerable, community-level populations on 
the part of national authorities, exemplified by the unexpected conflicts in the 
Maldives and the hurdles faced by the Carteret Islanders.
With a clear eye on the perils and possibilities of the GCF, a number of policy 
approaches might buffer against the political gaps that country ownership exacer­
bates and provide appropriate responses to the funding gap in an overall deficient 
funding landscape. With respect to country ownership, avenues that further 
enhance direct access to small, local, community-based NGOs could ease access 
to the GCF’s financial support. As discussed further below, there is an existing 
infrastructure of grassroots grant-making organizations that can partner with and 
leverage GCF funding in a cost-effective manner. The GCF is also contemplating 
attracting other forms of finance, namely through the philanthropic sector.66 This 
vehicle may be the best way for consistent and increasing funding to reach effective 
and credible organizations led by and for the benefit of women, indigenous peoples, 
and other vulnerable communities, including those forced to relocate.
Best P ractices from the A daptation Fund and the G lobal Environment 
Facility
Community-based adaptation can address the concerns regarding locally 
responsive and supportive adaptation, and migration and relocation needs, and 
ensure the most impactful and expansive application of funds for greater resil-
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ience. There are important examples of this kind of funding that already exist. 
This section briefly outlines and introduces the most relevant elements of the 
Adaptation Fund and the Global Environment Facility.67 The latter is the most 
promising and instructive with respect to community-level support through its 
small grants programming.68
Relevant to the present discussion, the Adaptation Fund has the specific 
mandate to finance adaptation with special atten­
tion promised to the most vulnerable communities.
This mandate closely aligns the fund with the goals 
of more community-oriented approaches, at least 
in principle.69 It is financed by sales of certified 
emission reductions under the Clean Development 
Mechanism to governments, the private sector, and 
individuals. Over the past three years, the fund 
has dedicated more than $232 million to increase 
climate resilience in forty countries. It is still unclear 
whether migration will be a recognized adaptation 
strategy for purposes of funding. Notwithstanding 
that uncertainty, other concerns arise. Its “innovative” country ownership orienta­
tion makes it more susceptible to increasing the distance between local communi­
ties that may be at odds with their governments and still need funding. Indeed, 
direct access has operated via National Implementing Entities that reflect national- 
level priorities through devolved management powers.70 Again, this is a notable and 
innovative increase in state-level ownership of adaptation projects and programs, as 
accredited national entities supplant multilateral intermediaries.71 This is progress, 
to be sure. Without further refinement, it may also come with significant, nega­
tive effects and, at best, evade opportunities to redefine certain categories related 
to adaptation that will assist in-country communities that must relocate and seek 
economic development and self-sufficiency as they craft their resettlement.
For greater community-level, direct access that can better elicit diverse and 
responsive measures for relocation, the Global Environmental Facility’s Small 
Grants Programme (GEF SPG) provides a promising template. The GEF became 
an official financial mechanism for the UNFCCC at the second Conference of the 
Parties (COP).7- The GEF manages two separate adaptation-focused funds under the 
UNFCCC—the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate 
Change Fund (SCCF). Despite its mandate not to support adaptation projects, 
the GEF’s SGP is most relevant as it has “emerged as a highly effective [funding] 
mechanism for delivering Community-Based Adaption (CBA) projects.”73 Elements 
that make the GEF SGP a model for decentralized and community-driven funding
It is still unclear 
whether or not 
migration will 
be a recognized 
adaptation strategy 
for purposes of 
funding.
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include: the creation of national steering committees that comprised a majority 
of civil society organizations, government, the United Nations Development 
Programme, academia, and the private sector; development of a national strategy 
for achieving CBA objectives “based on local context and circumstances;” and, 
technical support for capacity building, among other things.74 Further, the GEF 
SGP has an established infrastructure to reach remote communities through sub­
regional mechanisms in addition to the National Steering Committee.75 Finally, as 
Fenton et al. note, the GEF SGP distributes initial grants of $5,000 for planning 
CBA projects, which “reduces the risks posed by immediately disbursing relatively 
large sums while improving the ability of communities to convene, discuss, and 
plan remedial actions and measures which can provide community-owned and 
implemented solutions.”76 Indeed, this mirrors the exact kind of funding that was 
so consequential for the Carteret Islanders.
The P romise of A lternative Funding Sources
While a number of proposed and often innovative funding sources exist, the 
potential transformative role of the philanthropic sector is important to note 
here.77 As introduced above, there is a significant opportunity to partner with and 
leverage existing philanthropic infrastructure, particularly for the provision of 
small grants. Independent charitable organizations can assist in ensuring efficient 
and impactful funding, with low transaction costs. The current network of organi­
zations operates in at least 100 countries, with direct grantmaking and a parallel 
emphasis on local capacity building.'8
A partnered approach is consistent with the GCF’s own investment criteria, 
which includes decisions based on “the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed 
intervention, including its ability to leverage additional funding.”79 The leveraging 
may be limited to the case of mitigation initially, but for optimal adaptation and 
relocation at the community level, an expansion of leveraging opportunities would 
be advantageous for the fund and those it seeks to aid.80
CONCLUSION
The Carteret Islanders will continue to chart their multi-year transition in the 
current funding landscape. This journey will occur at the same historical moment 
as the international community assembles its greatest climate finance structure to 
date and debates that structure’s bedrock principles. The climate finance regime— 
public or private—can benefit from observing and incorporating the lessons and 
experiences of the Carteret Islanders. Those facing relocation, a likely expanding 
number, clearly benefit from this purposeful observation.
The preeminent emerging climate finance vehicle has conflicting mandates.
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The GCF must respect country ownership and a country-driven approach to 
climate finance. It must also remain sensitive to the most vulnerable. Crafting 
funding vehicles that engage the most remote communities could introduce trans­
formative policy across other remote, ocean-based communities and economies 
across the globe, cfc?
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